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It has been suggested that children with autism are particularly deficient at imitating novel gestures or gestures without goals. In the
present study, we asked high-functioning autistic children and age-matched typically developing children to imitate several types
of gestures that could be either already known or novel to them. Known gestures either conveyed a communicative meaning (i.e.,
intransitive) or involved the use of objects (i.e., transitive). We observed a significant interaction between gesture type and group of
participants, with children with autism performing known gestures better than novel gestures. However, imitation of intransitive
and transitive gestures did not differ across groups.These findings are discussed in light of a dual-route model for action imitation.
1. Introduction
The relationship between autism and imitation deficits was
envisaged long time ago by Ritvo and Province [1], short after
autism was originally described in the work of Kanner [2].
The imitative ability has been acknowledged to play an essen-
tial role in normal development, as it can be used by infants
to acquire and master new behaviors [3, 4]. In recent years,
the relationship between autism and voluntary imitation
has been investigated more systematically. In their review,
for instance, Williams et al. [5] concluded that children
with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are consistently
impaired in performing imitative tasks relative to children
with other developmental delays (matched for chronological
age, verbal IQ-mental age and expressive language (see [6, 7]),
or to normal controls matched for mental age [7, 8]. ASD
children performed more poorly on imitation tasks than
matched-to-language controls or younger children matched
for receptive language and mental age [8], thus ruling out
the interpretation that the imitation impairment is due to a
linguistic deficit.
Neither can the imitative deficit of ASD individuals be
attributed to a defective gesture recognition [6, 8], since
they recognized gestures without any trouble.Moreover, ASD
individuals’ fine grainedmotor skills, evenwhen reduced, did
not correlate with their observed imitation and praxis deficits
[8].
Moreover, irrespective of whether they are low or high
functioning, children with autism seem to have difficulties in
imitating gestures that disable children and typically develop-
ing children do not show [9]. This finding supports the view
that imitation deficits are specific to ASD (see also [5]).
Whether the reduced ability to imitate of ASD children is
a true deficit or a delay in development is still under debate.
This deficit seems to be already present in children as young as
20 months and is, in general, more apparent in children than
in adults [5]. Consistently, an improvement in performance
was observed when young ASD children, with a mean age of
31 months, were retested about one year later [7].
Williams et al. [5] proposed that observing a meaningful
(MF) object or gesture triggers the release of a previously
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rehearsed program or that observing a desired outcome
might lead the observers to reach this goal by applying
their own problem solving ability. This process is known
as emulation. Hence, imitation itself would be especially
required for copying meaningless (ML) gestures that do not
have an obvious goal or associated knowledge [5].This would
explain why in some studies ASD children were reported
to experience more difficulty when imitating ML compared
with MF gestures involving objects [6, 7].
It has been shown that ASD children imitate goal-
directed actions as well as healthy children with the same
verbal mental age do [10]. Hamilton et al. [10] argued that
the ability to imitate (and understand) the goal of hand
actions is intact in ASD children who, however, might fail
to perform the imitation tasks in which they cannot rely
on a hand-goal strategy as in the case of ML actions. They
also suggested that it is unlikely that a unique neurocognitive
mechanism underlies imitative behavior in either the typical
or autistic brain. Consistently with this view, Hamilton [11]
put forward a dual-route model for emulation and planning
versus mimicry (EP-Mmodel) and proposed that the latter is
impaired in children with autism. According to this model,
the mirror neuron system is fractioned into an indirect,
parietal route for goal emulation and planning and a direct
occipitofrontal route formimicry. In the case of the E-P route,
the presence of an object or goal allows an individual to
extract the teleological understanding of the action and to
reconstruct the same action by his/her own means. The M-
route is based on the analysis of low level kinematics of an
action and allows the formation of direct associations from
visual input to motor output [11].
However, whether children with ASD are able to imitate
communicative gestures (such as waving a hand for goodbye)
is still debated. Communicative gestures, even though they
have been included in the assessment of more than one study,
have either been analysed together with other gesture types
(e.g., [7]) or, when analysed as a separate class, they were
found to be imitated normally [6].This latter result is difficult
to interpret because, in addition to the instruction to imitate,
participants were also provided with verbal encouragement
(e.g., “Show someone that you are a champion”). Moreover,
different studies used different tasks and included partici-
pants of different ages (for children see [8]; for adolescents
see [6]; for adults see [7]).
If, according to the EP-M model, children with autism
have a selective damage to the mimicry route [10, 11],
one would predict that they should be equally impaired at
imitating novel as well as symbolic, communicative gestures.
In fact, as these two types of gestures do not have an
obvious outcome, children cannot rely on an emulation
and/or problem solving. A different set of predictions can be
drawn based on a dual-route model of action imitation [12]
(see also [13, 14]) that is also consistent with the conclusions
reached by Williams et al. [5]. The key feature of Tessari and
Rumiati’s model is the presence of two different mechanisms
subserving imitation: a direct route necessary for reproducing
novel, ML actions, as it translates the visual input into a
motor output and an indirect route that can be used only
for imitating over-learned, MF actions, as it accesses the
stored representations of the motor act. Since both symbolic
communicative (i.e., intransitive) and transitive gestures (i.e.,
actions that involve the use of objects) are already known
by the subjects, imitation of either type of gestures should
be comparable in terms of accuracy. After brain damage,
each mechanism can be selectively impaired, giving rise
to different imitation deficits affecting either known or
novel actions [15–18]. In particular, when the direct route is
damaged, patients cannot imitate novel actions, while when
the indirect route is damaged, they cannot use it to imitate
known actions. These findings were observed when known,
and novel actions were presented in separate lists.
In the present study, we aimed to clarify how high-
functioning autistic (HFA) children imitated different types
of actions (i.e., known MF symbolic communicative, pan-
tomime of object use, and novelML actions) and to test which
of the available models best accounts for their impaired-
preserved imitative pattern. Importantly, we consider that
investigating imitation performance in ASD is highly valu-
able as it allows testing current theoretical models of imita-
tion.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants. Thirteen high-functioning children with
autism (M = 7.31 years old, SD = 1.79; all males) and 14
typically developing children (M = 7.00 years old, SD = 1.71;
allmales) participated in the study. Age did not differ between
the two groups (t(26) = 0.46, 𝑃 > 0.1). All children were
right-handed (average on the percentage of right hand use
HFA: M = 90.91%, SD = 15.02, controls: M = 89.89%, SD =
16.62). All autistic participants were clinically diagnosed
as having a pervasive development disorder—not other-
wise specified—according to DSM-IV. None of the patients
had comorbid attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), seizure disturbance, or any other associated dis-
order known to cause autism. Intelligence scales and autism
specific scales were administered by each child responsi-
ble therapist. High-functioning autistic participants were
selected if they had a full scale IQ > 70 and they scored above
threshold for autistic spectrum disorder on the children
autistic rating scale (CARS) or ADOS (see Table 1). Children
with autism were recruited through the neuropsychological
unit at “La Nostra Famiglia” (Pasian di Prato, Udine, Italy).
Typically, developing children were recruited from local
schools and were administered an intelligence scale (WISC,
verbal subscale) by the experimenter. Ethical permission
for the study was granted by SISSA ethical committee, and
informed consent was given by one parent of each child.
2.2. Imitation Task. All children attended the experimental
session for approximately 1 hour. Stimuli consisted of five sets
of 12 simple, nonsequential gestures each. Of these, three sets
included MF gestures: 12 transitive gestures without objects
like, for instance, pretending to pour from an imagined bottle
(all taken from [12]), 12 intransitive symbolic gestures like,
for instance, waving goodbye, “victory,” and “come here” (all
taken from [19]), and 12 transitive gestures performed with
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Table 1:Demographical information about the two groups and their performance on diagnostic standardised tests.Mean (standard deviation)
and range are provided for each group.
N Age Verbal IQ(WISC, Griffiths)
Performance IQ
(WISC, Griffiths)
Full scale
(WISC, Griffiths, or
Leiter)
CARS ADOS
Autistic group 13 7.31 (1.79)5–11
86.91 (21.61)
54–116
(𝑛 = 11)
89.92 (19.53)
66–126
(𝑛 = 12)
88.58 (17.72)
70–118
(𝑛 = 13)
42.35 (4.18)
35.5–48
(𝑛 = 10)
12.33 (6.66)
8–20
(𝑛 = 3)
Control group 14 7 (1.71)4–10
127.38 (25.10)
92–156 — — — —
an object like, for instance, pouring from a real bottle. The
remaining two sets included 24 meaningless (ML) gestures,
obtained by modifying the relationship between hand, arm,
and trunk of the MF transitive and intransitive gestures.
ML and MF actions were as much as possible matched for
complexity. Each action was displayed up to two times for
3 seconds on a computer screen using Presentation software
(Neurobs). All actions were modelled by a female adult using
her right hand arm; subjects were only given the instruction
“do what she does” without mentioning the hand they should
use. When performing the gestures, the model kept the gaze
fixed straight ahead, thus avoiding confound effects regarding
the possibility of reading intentions from gaze [20].
Participants’ performancewas video-recorded and scored
offline by a rater, blind to the predictions of the study and
to group membership, who was instructed to code each
action using a 3-point scale system: 0 for totally incorrect,
1 partially correct, and 2 for correct imitation. For the
partially incorrect imitative performance, the rater was asked
to code the errors with one of 15 a priori defined error-
types (see the appendix) and report the hand used in each
trial. Participants could begin the experimental session either
with MF (3 blocks) or ML gestures (2 blocks), and this
order was counterbalanced across participants. An additional
rater scored the performance of approximately 30% of the
participants, and a good interraters agreement was obtained
(Cohen’s Kappa = 0.65, S.E. = 0.052).
Two types of assessment were carried out in order to
ascertain what participants knew about the intransitive and
transitive gestures employed in the study. For the symbolic
intransitive actions, participants were asked to say whether
they knew the meaning of each action (n = 12); for the
transitive gestures, participants were presented with the
corresponding object and asked to demonstrate how it is
normally used. This latter task allowed us also to evaluate
participants’ hand dominance, given that no instructions
were provided to the children as to which hand they should
use with the object placed on the table in front of them. The
order of the imitative tasks and of the knowledge assessment
tasks was counterbalanced across subjects.
3. Results
3.1. Imitation. For each participant, MF (transitive or intran-
sitive) gestures that were not recognized were not included in
the analysis. HFA children were able to recognize on average
74.36% (SD = 14.22) and control children 85.61% (SD =
5.16) of the intransitive gestures. HFA children were able to
demonstrate the use of objects (transitive actions) on average
98.71% (SD = 3.13) and control children 100%.
A repeated-measures ANOVA on percentage of imitative
correct responses with meaning (ML, MF) and context
(transitive, intransitive) as within-subjects independent vari-
ables and with group (HFA, controls) as a between-subjects
variable (see Figure 1) was performed. Overall, the HFA
group imitated more poorly (M = 73.26, SE = 3.96) than
the control group (M = 90.10, SE = 3.82); meaningful
actions (M = 89.10, SE = 2.22) were performed better than
meaningless (M = 74.28, SE = 3.54), and the accuracy with
intransitive actions (M = 82.33, SE = 2.72) and transitive
actions was comparable (M = 81.01, SE = 3.32). Main effects
of group and meaning were found to be significant (F(1, 26)
= 9.355, 𝑃 = 0.005; F(1, 26) = 45.84, 𝑃 < 0.001, resp.) but
not the main effect of context (F(1, 26) = 0.26, 𝑃 > 0.05). As
predicted, the two-way interactions group × meaning (F(1,
26) = 6.21, 𝑃 < 0.05) were significant but not the two-way
interaction group × context (F(1, 26) = 0.26, 𝑃 > 0.05) nor
the 3-way interaction (group × context ×meaning: F(1, 26) =
0.35, 𝑃 > 0.05). Context × meaning interactions were also
found significant (F(1, 26) = 14.59, 𝑃 = 0.001 resp.).
In order to better understand the interactions, we per-
formed subsequent post hoc analysis. As to the meaning ×
group interaction, no differences were found between HFA
and control children in imitation of MF actions (Tukey, 𝑃 >
0.1), whereas differences were found for imitation of ML
actions (Tukey, 𝑃 < 0.05). The difference between imitation
of MF and ML actions is driven mostly by HFA children
who imitated ML actions more poorly (Tukey, 𝑃 < 0.001).
Control children imitated MF actions somewhat better than
ML actions (Tukey, 𝑃 = 0.024, see Figure 1). Regarding the
Context × Meaning interaction, no significant differences
were found in imitating transitive and intransitiveML actions
(Tukey, 𝑃 > 0.1), while intransitive MF actions were found
to be better imitated than transitive MF actions (Tukey, 𝑃 =
0.019). However, the context × meaning interaction seems
to be mostly driven by differences in imitating intransitive
actions: imitation of intransitive MF actions and imitation of
intransitive ML actions were highly significant (Tukey, 𝑃 <
0.001) (with Bonferroni correction for 𝑃 values).
The two groups did not significantly differ as far as
imitation of actions involving real objectswas concerned (F(1,
26) = 1.59, 𝑃 > 0.05). Importantly, we found no significant
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Figure 1: Accuracy on the imitative tasks of the experimental HFA group (in black) and control group (in grey). The bars represent standard
deviations from the mean. Upper plot depicts correct imitation of meaningless (ML) and meaningful (MF) according to whether they are
transitive or intransitive.
correlation between individual IQ quotients and the imitative
performance on neither ML actions (𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑃 > 0.05) nor
MF actions (𝑟 = 0.32, 𝑃 > 0.05).
In order to assess whether children IQ level influenced
their individual imitative performance, we computed an anal-
ysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with group (HFA, controls)
and IQ scores as predictors. The covariate variable (IQ) was
standardized prior to performing the analysis, by centering
themean (see [21]). Consistentwith the correlational analysis,
we found that overall IQ level did not influence participants
imitative performance (F(1, 24) = 2.362, 𝑃 > 0.1), not even
when the meaning of actions was taken into account (IQ ×
meaning interaction: F(1, 24) = 0.232, 𝑃 > 0.6). The other
factors did not change.
3.2. Does Age Matter? We correlated the performance on
imitation of MF and ML actions, regardless of whether
they were transitive or intransitive, with the age of the
control participants and of the HFA children, respectively
(see Figure 2). We found that the imitative performance of
the control group on ML actions (but not that of meaningful
actions, 𝑟 = 0.51, 𝑃 > 0.05) significantly correlated with
increasing subjects’ age (𝑟 = 0.56, 𝑃 < 0.05), while the
imitative performance of the HFA group on either type of
gestures significantly correlated with their increasing age
(MF: 𝑟 = 0.72, 𝑃 < 0.05; ML: 𝑟 = 0.79, 𝑃 < 0.001). Due to
a clear outlier in the control group (a child with 4 years old),
we have recalculated the correlations regarding the control
group excluding this participant. In contrast with the HFA
ISRN Neurology 5
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
C
or
re
ct
 re
sp
on
se
s (
%
)
Age
Control group
ML (cluster)
MF (cluster)
(a)
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C
or
re
ct
 re
sp
on
se
s (
%
)
Age
HFA group
ML (cluster)
MF (cluster)
(b)
Figure 2: Overall imitation of ML and MF actions correlated with age of subjects in (a) the control group and (b) the HFA group.
group, the results show now that neither the performance
of ML actions nor of MF actions correlated with the age of
participants (MF: 𝑟 = −0.06, 𝑃 > 0.55; ML: 𝑟 = 0.29,
𝑃 > 0.05).
3.3. Specular and Anatomical Imitation. Participants could
imitate a gesture by selecting the same limb used by the
model (i.e., anatomical imitation) or by using the one on
the same side of the model’s body as if they were looking
in a mirror (i.e., specular imitation). It has often been
claimed that typically developing children at a young age
tend to prefer specular over anatomical imitation and that
the preference becomes apparent when they are about 12
years old [22]. Which kind of imitation ASD children prefer
is still not clear. In one study, unlike controls, adults with
autism did not benefit from viewing other person’s mirror-
image movements [23], while in another one, both control
andASDchildren showed a preference formirror imitation of
hand actions [10]. In these studies, since themodel performed
the action using the left hand in half of the trials while the
imitator tended to use predominantly the dominant right
hand, it is difficult to establish whether participants preferred
the specular to the anatomical imitation.
Figure 3 plots the percentage of trials in which partici-
pants used the left hand (specular imitation) to imitate the
different types of gestures. Although the autistic group made
more use than the control group of specular imitation in all
imitative tasks, on theMann-Whitney𝑈 test for independent
samples, no significant differences were found between the
two groups on imitation of transitive (𝑈 = −0.46, 𝑃 > 0.1)
and intransitive ML gestures (𝑈 = −0.20, 𝑃 > 0.1), transitive
with (𝑈 = −1.6, 𝑃 > 0.1) and without (𝑈 = −0.23, 𝑃 > 0.1)
the actual object at hand, and intransitive MF gestures (𝑈 =
−0.41, 𝑃 > 0.1).
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Figure 3: Percentage of specular and anatomical imitations for each
type of imitative tasks.
4. Discussion
In the current study we aimed to understand whether
childrenwith autism have a generalized deficit in imitating all
gesture types or they only fail with object nonrelated gestures.
We therefore tested a sample of high-functioning children
with a clinical diagnosis of autism and an age-matched
sample of typically developing children for their ability to
imitate either novel or known gestures. Gestures could, or
could not, involve the presence of an object (transitive or
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intransitive). In agreement with Williams et al. [5] view,
we found that, relative to control children, high-functioning
autistic children were more impaired in imitating novel than
known actions. In addition, we found that the imitative
performance of either group of participants was not depen-
dent on whether the gesture implied the use of an object
or not (transitive versus symbolic communicative), as both
MF transitive and symbolic communicative gestures were
imitated equally well by both groups.
In particular, the finding that imitation of object-related
actions as well as symbolic communicative gestures is pre-
served in ASD children is inconsistent with the hypothesis
put forward by Hamilton [11]. According to this author’s
proposal, children with autism are able to imitate only
gestures that imply the use of an object (or include a clear
goal) as its presence allows the emulation of the action instead
of mimicry. An individual emulates an observed action by
first extracting the goal of the action and then planning and
reconstructing it by its own means [11]. The fact that HFA
and control children imitate equally well MF actions that do
not have an object associated (i.e., symbolic communicative
gestures) challenges the view that autistic children are only
able to emulate.
The finding that, in HFA children, imitation of both tran-
sitive and intransitive MF actions is intact while imitation of
ML actions is impaired strongly suggests that they suffer from
a selective damage to one of the two putative mechanisms for
action imitation hypothesised by Tessari and Rumiati [12]:
the direct route. The access to the representational system
for actions stored in memory appears to be intact in these
children.
Our results could possibly have useful implications for an
early diagnose of the disorder, in that, we suggest that only
the use of ML actions is appropriate for assessing imitation
skills. Due to several factors, the diagnosis of autism is still
often made quite belatedly (around 6 years of age [24])
because it is based on the assessment of language skills
that do not develop before the first year of life. Our study
suggests that testing imitation could be used for identifying
the eventual presence of the disorder without having to wait
for the emergence of linguistic abilities, particularly in high-
functioning children. The fact that HFA children imitated
MF actions that convey a communicative meaning just like
the control group did is apparently in contrast with the view
that autism is primarily associated with social deficits (e.g.,
[25]). According to this position, and in contrast to our data,
it should be expected that the stimuli that pose difficulties
for autistic children are those that carry emotional or social
content. Although any type of imitation procedure involves
the interaction between the child and another person, not all
imitation procedures seem to be impaired in ASD children.
What is striking about our results is that, while the gestures
that explicitly carried social or communicative content were
correctly imitated by the ASD children, the gestures that
did not have any special social content were not correctly
imitated. As imitation processes have been acknowledged to
play an important role in empathy, for they promote shared
mutuality in social interactions and force social bonding
[26], the social deficits in autism, such as poor interaction
with others or retraction from social interaction, might be
secondary to and develop as in consequence of the imitation
deficit described in ASD. Regarding imitation of both ML
and MF gestures, the accuracy of autistic children tended
to improve with participant’s increasing age. The recovery of
symptoms in ASD has long been debated and mechanisms
that might promote it have been systematically scrutinized
(see [27] for a review). Although our results cannot be
taken as definitive evidence, they are in agreement with
the hypothesis that the imitative ASD children’s difficulties
might not represent a true deviance but rather a delay
in development, as they ameliorate as children get older.
Therefore, the imitative deficit could be expected to back
down as the child gets older.
In the present study, we evaluated the ability to imi-
tate of high-functioning autistic children using a voluntary
imitation procedure rather than an automatic imitation
paradigm (see e.g., [28]), whereby participants show a facil-
itation effect (shorter reaction times, RT) when executing
a prefixed movement at the same time as they observe the
same movement (compatible trials); in contrast, observing
a movement incompatible with the preinstructed one leads
to an interference (longer RT). This paradigm has been
suggested to tap the mirror neuron system in humans [29];
as performance on it has been found to be preserved in ASD
[30], it is not clear whether ASD individual performs poorly
on imitation tasks due to a malfunctioning mirror neuron
system [31]. Although we do not directly tackle automatic
imitation in the present study, we predict that an abnormal
mirror neuron system would affect primarily actions that are
already present in one’s own repertoire (known actions) [32].
We failed to find any difference between specular and
anatomical imitation. In approximately half of the trials,
participants did prefer to imitate with their nondominant
hand, mirroring the observedmovement. Overall, our results
suggest that, for both autistic and typically developing chil-
dren, imitating an observed movement in a specular manner
might be beneficial.
In conclusion, our main findings on the imitative perfor-
mance of HFA children inform us of a dissociation between
imitation of MF actions and imitation of ML novel actions.
This fact is rather suggestive of a preserved indirect memory-
based mechanism to imitation together with a potentially
malfunctioning direct route to imitation.
Appendix
Imitative Performance Error Type
(1) Spatial error of the hand: the overall movement of the
limb is correct, but the hand posture is wrong.
(2) Spatial error of the arm: the arm posture is wrong.
(3) Spatial error of fingers: the overall movement of the
limb and hand is correct, but the finger posture is
wrong.
(4) Spatial orientation error: the armmoves in the wrong
direction or in the wrong plane.
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(5) Spatial error of movement endpoint: the movement
endpoint is not reproduced correctly.
(6) Static-dynamic spatial error: static posture is pro-
duced in response to a dynamic action, or a dynamic
movement is produced when the expected target
action involves rhythmic or repetitive movement.
(7) Kinematic error: movement is in the wrong direction,
different velocity, and different trajectory.
(8) Prototypicalization: a prototypical version of the
action is performed (this applies only to MF actions).
(9) Visuosemantic: the action is visually similar and
semantically related to the target action (this applies
only to MF actions).
(10) Perserveration: a movement composed of a combina-
tion of gestures previously presented or executed.
(11) Global perserveration: an action previously presented
or executed is reproduced instead of the target action.
(12) Lexicalization: a meaningful action, visual similar to
the meaningless target action (but not included in the
list), is produced (this applies only to ML actions).
(13) Substitution: a visual similar meaningful action (not
included in the list) is produced instead of the mean-
ingful action that was presented (this applies only to
MF actions).
(14) First attempt error: there is one first and faulty attempt
to imitate the action, which is corrected, and a correct
answer is provided at last.
(15) Crossing, not crossing: correct gesture but occurring
in the wrong side of the body space.
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